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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890435-CA

v.
Category No. 2

DAVID LEE BARRETT,
Defendant/Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989).

A plea of no contest

was entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for
Juab County, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, presiding.

This Court

has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether exigent
circumstance and probable cause were present to justify a
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David Lee Barrett, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance.

Defendant filed a motion

to suppress the evidence seized in a warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle (R. 18). Upon the trial court's denial of
the motion, defendant entered a no contest plea pursuant to State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), specifically
reserving his right to withdraw that plea should this Court rule
in his favor on appeal (R. 40).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 28, 1988 at approximately 1:30 p.m., Trooper
Paul Mangelson, a 22 year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, was
on duty on the northbound lanes of 1-15 between the two Nephi,
Utah, exits (T. 4). He had just finished issuing a citation when
two vehicles, which appeared to him to be traveling together at
the same speed, passed him.

Mangelson thought the cars were

exceeding the speed limit and clocked them at the speed of 75
miles per hour.

After some difficulty, he pulled both vehicles

over (T. 5). Trooper Mangelson parked between the two cars, went
to the rear vehicle, driven by defendant, and told defendant that
he would be right back after taking care of the front vehicle.
Trooper Mangelson discovered a large duffel bag of marijuana in
the trunk of the first vehicle (T. 6, 7). He returned to
defendant's vehicle and asked him for his driver's license and
whether defendant was traveling with the first vehicle.
Defendant replied that he was not.
-9-

Trooper Mangelson, who

estimated that the front vehicle was over one hundred feet ahead
of defendant's vehicle, smelled marijuana at defendant's vehicle
(T. 7, 37). Defendant refused to consent to a search of his
vehicle, and Trooper Mangelson, based on the strong smell of raw
marijuana and his prior experience, searched defendant's vehicle
and found approximately 35 pounds of marijuana in the trunk (T.
7, 8). The marijuana was packed in a large blue duffel bag
identical to the bag found in the front car (T. 8, 9). Defendant
was arrested for possession of marijuana and issued a citation
for traveling at 75 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone (T. 12, 13).
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence seized by Trooper Mangelson, Trooper Mangelson testified
to the reasons he searched defendant's vehicle.

He stated that

the strong smell of raw marijuana, the absence of luggage in the
passenger compartment of defendant's vehicle and the fact that
the two vehicles he stopped appeared to be traveling together, a
drug courier scenario that he had seen on one prior occasion, led
him to believe that defendant was transporting marijuana (T. 8,
10, 11). Trooper Mangelson also testified that defendant was
extremely nervous and tried to prevent Trooper Mangelson from
opening the vehicle's trunk (T. 14-16).

The marijuana seized

from defendant was in individually wrapped packages, and Trooper
Mangelson found no evidence of the use of any substance in the
packaging to conceal its odor (T. 28, 39).

In addition, Trooper

At page six of his appellate brief, defendant states that the
small bags of marijuana in his vehicle were insulated from each
other by the use of baking soda, an odor suppressing agent. He
further states that the small bags were packed in several larger
garbage bags and that those were insulated from one another with

Mangelson testified that he did not open the garbage bag
(presumably found inside the duffel bag) containing marijuana
from the front vehicle prior to his search of defendant's vehicle
(T. 38). 2
At the suppression hearing the trial court found that
Trooper Mangelson had observed two cars that he believed were
traveling together and exceeding the speed limit and that he made
a valid highway stop (T. 80-81).

It also found that Trooper

Mangelson had smelled marijuana in defendant's vehicle and that,
based on his long experience of smelling marijuana and his
numerous arrests in the area, he had a superior ability to detect
the odor of marijuana (T. 81-83).

The Court concluded that

exigent circumstances and probable cause were present and were
sufficient to justify a warrantless search of defendant's vehicle
(T. 83).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress because the warrantless search of defendant's automobile
and the subsequent seizure of marijuana was legally justified.

Cont. baking soda. Defendant cites both Trooper Mangelson's
and defendant's testimonies in support of the statements.
However, Trooper Mangelson specifically stated that he found no
evidence of an odor suppressing agent (T. 39). Defendant stated
only that he saw baking soda spilled when the marijuana was
unpacked (T. 50). No testimony was presented specifying, as
defendant states, the layer by layer packaging with baking soda.
2
Defendant, at page 5 of his appellate brief, states twice that
Trooper Mangelson unpacked the marijuana in the front vehicle
before searching defendant's vehicle. Those assertions are not
supported by the record. At no time did Trooper Mangelson
testify that he unpacked the marijuana from the first vehicle; in
fact, he stated that the garbage bag in which it was packed had

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AFTER
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE; THE SEIZURE OF MARIJUANA WAS
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED FOR
THE SEARCH AND THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO
THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIRMENT APPLIES IN THIS
CASE.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because Trooper Mangelson did not have
probable cause to search defendant's vehicle and exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless search were not present.
In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court applies the
following standard:
In considering the trial court's action
in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. .
. . The trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
'correction of error' standard. . . .
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted).

But see State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 122

(Utah 1983); State v. Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985);
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987) (which suggest
that the "clearly erroneous" standard applies to the trial
court's factual evaluation and its legal conclusion).

In the

instant case defendant disputes both the facts attendant to the
search of his vehicle and the court's legal conclusion that the
search was constitutional.

In contesting the trial court's factual findings,
defendant asserts that Trooper Mangelson could not have smelled
the raw marijuana in defendant's vehicle.

In the alternative,

defendant argues that even if Trooper Mangelson had smelled
marijuana, it must have come from the front vehicle, parked a
short distance up the road where already he had found marijuana.
(Br. of App. at 18). Defendant states that Trooper Mangelson had
unpacked the 60 pounds of marijuana from the front vehicle and
still had the smell of marijuana on his hands.

Defendant states

further that the marijuana in defendant's vehicle was packaged in
approximately 30 zip-lock plastic bags, surrounded by 6 to 10
garbage bags insulated with odor suppressing agents.
does not support such factual conclusions.

The record

Trooper Mangelson

testified that he dectected the strong smell of marijuana at
defendant's vehicle (T. 78). He stated that he did not unpack
the marijuana from the front vehicle, and no testimony exists
stating that he did unpack the marijuana (T. 38). He also stated
that he found no evidence of any odor suppressing agent in the
packaging of the marijuana in defendant's vehicle (T. 39).
Defendant did testify to the presence of baking soda when
defendant unpacked the marijuana at a later time (T. 50).
However, he did not offer any evidence attesting to the efficacy
of baking soda as an odor suppressing agent.

It is the trial

court's function, when acting as the trier of fact, to assess the
credibility of the witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327; State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987).

In light of the evidence

received, the trial court's finding that Trooper Mangelson did
smell raw marijuana at defendant's vehicle was not clearly
erroneous.
Defendant argues that Trooper Mangelson lacked probable
cause to search defendant's vehicle.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated that "warrantless vehicle searches are not invalid under
the Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a search exists."
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (citations
omitted).

Applying the United States Supreme Court definition of

probable cause for a vehicle search, the Cour-c in Dorsey stated
that probable cause was
a belief, reasonably arising out of the
circumstances known to the seizing officer,
that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure . . .
Probable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed.
Id. at 1088 (citing United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 149,
162 (1925), and Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76
(1949)).
The validity of the probable cause
determination is made from the objective
standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable,
cautious police officer . . . guided by his
experience and training.'
Id.

(citations omitted).
This Court, in State v. Bartley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40

(Utah Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1989), has applied the "plain view"
doctrine, as it encompasses "plain smell," to determine whether

probable cause existed for a warrantless vehicle search.

Bartley

was a case involving the seizure of "drip gas" resulting from the
sheriff's smelling the readily apparent, unique odor of "drip
gas."

There, this Court applied the three-prong test of whether:

(1) the officer was lawfully present; (2) the object could be
plainly smelled; and (3) the odor was clearly incriminating. Id.
at 42 (noting that there was no "reasonable expectation of
privacy from the 'inquisitive nostrils' of lawfully present
officers and citing United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398
(9th Cir. 1974)).

"Clearly incriminating" was defined as having

"probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity." j[d. (citations omitted).
Defendant argues that there are no plain smell cases
similar to the instant case, where the smell of raw, rather than
burned, marijuana constituted probable cause for a warrantless
search and seizure.

However, numerous federal cases uphold the

seizure of marijuana based on the officer's smelling of the odor
of its raw form.

In United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494

F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1974), the warrantless vehicle search and
seizure of bulk raw marijuana from a car's trunk were upheld
where officers, sniffing around the crevice where the trunk
closes, detected the odor of marijuana.

See also United States

v. Ogden, 572 F.2d 501, 502 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 439 U.S. 979
(1978) ("The agents' identification of the odor of marijuana is
enough to support probable cause to search. . . .

No warrant is

required for the search of an automobile under such
circumstances."); United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1099

(5th Cir. 1979) ("It is well settled that detection of the odor
of marijuana furnishes probable cause to search a vehicle,").
In light of the federal cases just cited, the smell of
raw marijuana could supply sufficient probable cause for a
search.

Application of the "plain smell" standard to the facts

of the instant case manifestly demonstrates that the search was
justified.

First, Trooper Mangelson was lawfully present at

defendant's vehicle, having validly stopped defendant for
3
exceeding the speed limit.

Second, Trooper Mangelson, who had

had many years of experience, had made "thousands" of drug
related arrests and had specific drug enforcement training,
testified to the "plain smell" of raw marijuana, which was
readily apparent to him.

Third, the odor of marijuana is per se

"clearly incriminating" because its possession in any quantity
without a prescription is unlawful.
(Supp. 1989).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)

Moreover, Trooper Mangelson testified to other

factors he considered prior to initiating his warrantless search
of defendant's vehicle.

The fact that defendant's vehicle and

the vehicle in front of his seemed to be traveling in tandem, a
drug courier practice familiar to Trooper Mangelson, the absence
of luggage in the passenger compartment and defendant's extreme
nervousness all contributed to his probable cause determination.
In that determination Trooper Mangelson acted in a prudent,
reasonable and cautious manner guided by his experience and
training.
Although defendant asserted below that the highway stop of his
vehicle was pretextual, no such argument is presented on appeal.

Defendant also argues that no exigent circumstances
were present in the instant case to justify a warrantless search
of defendant's vehicle.

He states that, in an automobile search,

"the presence of exigent circumstances cannot be assumed but must
be compelling before a warrantless search is justified." (Br. of
App. at 11).

Defendant fails to cite any legal authority for

this "compelling exigent circumstance" standard, and the State
can find no evidence of the existence of such a standard.
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution subject to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

The United

States Supreme Court first developed the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

In that case the Court

stated that, if reasonable and probable cause existed for
believing that a vehicle contained contraband, an officer could
search the vehicle for that contraband without a warrant. Id., at
153, 156.

The Court initially based its ruling on the ready

mobility of a vehicle but over the years expanded the bases for
the exception.

The Court, in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386

(1985), stated that one's expectation of privacy with respect to
one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to
one's home or office and that the reduced expectation derived
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles traveling on public
highways.

Jd. at 390-392 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

U.S. 364, 367 (1976), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-

-10-

41 (1973)).

The Court has consistently held that a search

warrant is not necessary where there is probable cause to search
an automobile stopped on the highway because the car is movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained.

Chambers v. Maroney,

399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have
recognized and applied the Carroll-Chambers doctrine.

See State

v. Shields, 28 Utah 405, 406, 503 P.2d 848, 849 (1972); State v.
Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978); State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d
1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In the instant case, the

circumstances of the warrantless search fall squarely within the
automobile exception.

The vehicle was lawfully stopped on a

highway, 1-15, and remained mobile.

Defendant was alerted to

Trooper Mangelson's intent to search for marijuana.

Defendant

could have disposed of the duffel bag filled with marijuana
within moments had he not been detained and his vehicle searched.
Defendant argues that it would not have been
"impractical" for Trooper Mangelson to obtain a search warrant by
radio or telephone.

The standard for conducting a warrantless

vehicle search is not "practicality" but the well-established
"automobile exception" standard discussed supra.

In support of

his argument in favor of procurement of a telephone warrant,
defendant cites State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987).

In

that case the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless
search of a residence.

While the search of an immobile house

with high expectations of privacy in Ashe is factually
distinguishable from the vehicle search in the instant case, even
there the Court specifically declined to rule on whether the
State had a burden of proving unavailability of a telephone
4
warrant. Id. at 1267.
Its statement of encouragement to law
enforcement agents to seek warrants whenever possible, as cited
by defendant, cannot be viewed as a mandate to use telephone
warrants, and since Ashe the Court has not spoken further on that
issue.

Id. at 1267 n. 59.
In conjunction with his arguments concerning telephone

warrant requirements, defendant urges the application of
independent state grounds covering the conducting of a
warrantless search.

However, defendant failed to raise or

analyze that issue at the trial level, and that failure precludes
this Court from considering it on appeal.

State v. Johnson, 771

P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Defendant further argues that because the VIN of the
car itself did not match the VIN on its registration, Trooper
Mangelson should have seized and impounded the car prior to his
search.

However, defendant did not make this argument at the

trial court.
on appeal.

Therefore, an appellate court will not consider it

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)

Defendant's cite to Justice Durham's dissent in Ashe is
inaccurate (Br. of App. at 19). There, Justice Durham urges the
establishment of a State burden to show unavailability of a
telephone warrant. However, Justice Durham's dissent is not the
majority opinion at the present time and cannot be relied upon as
being dispositive of the issue. Moreover, the majority's
specific refusal to rule on that issue cannot be viewed as an
endorsement of Justice Durham's position.
-12-

("where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for
suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal")•
Finally, defendant cites Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971), and State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981),
as "indistinguishable" from the instant case for fourth amendment
purposes.

The contrary is true.

In Coolidge, a vehicle was

searched pursuant to a substantively deficient warrant (the
warrant had been issued by the Attorney General in charge of the
investigation acting as a Justice of the Peace) two days after it
had been towed to the police station and impounded.

None of the

Carroll-Chambers exigencies were present in that case, and the
Supreme Court appropriately found the automobile exception to be
irrelevant.

In State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), the

Utah Supreme Court upheld the impoundment and warrantless search
of a vehicle that police had good reason to believe was used in
the commission of a crime even though it was parked in front of a
residence at the time of the search and its occupants had already
been arrested.

Defendant apparently relies on Justice Wilkins's

dissent in Griffin to support his position, but a dissent,
however persuasive it may be to defendant, is not binding on this
Court.

Moreover, the facts in Griffin as in Coolidge are

substantively different from those in the instant case, in which
all the factors incident to application of the automobile
exception are present.

Relying on its factual findings and

applying the applicable legal standards, the trial court properly
concluded that both probable cause and exigent circumstances
existed for the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

DATED this

?4

day of January, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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